It was a terrorist invasion of India: Operation Bluestar commanderDecember 5th, 2008 - 12:11 pm ICT by IANS
New Delhi, Dec 5 (IANS) Lt. Gen. K.S. Brar, who led the traumatic military action against terrorists holed up in the Golden Temple in 1984, has dubbed the horrific massacre in Mumbai and other serial bombings across the country as a “terrorist invasion of India”.”What we have seen in Mumbai, Delhi, Ahmedabad and elsewhere can be best described as a terrorist invasion of India by well trained, highly motivated fidayeen and jehadis,” the now retired Gen Brar told IANS from Mumbai.
He regretted that though there was ample evidence pointing to the direct or indirect involvement of Pakistan, India has failed to demonstrate the strength to take suitable retaliatory actions or even prevent them.
Gen Brar attributed this to the lack of political will and the government’s reluctance to deal with the grave situation on a war footing as well as to genuinely address the concerns of the common man “who is always at the mercy of ruthless killers”.
“I am appalled by how it was possible for terrorists to walk into the heart of Mumbai through the coastal route and wander off to their designated targets without detection,” he said.
Brar led the Indian Army’s storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984 that led to the killing of fiery preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale among scores of Sikh rebels who had taken sanctuary inside the shrine and had converted it into a militant outpost.
“The media should also realise that even the NSG (National Security Guard) personnel who exterminated the terrorists were members of the army’s Special Action Group in the NSG, the country’s prime counter-terrorist unit.”
He pointed out how NSG commandos were rushed into combat without providing them with reasonable “real time” intelligence inputs and they were unaware of the exact locations of the terrorists.
“Besides, they did not receive proper briefings from the commanders of the forces engaged in the firefight. There was no unified command from whom they could receive instructions,” he said.
“Neither was there specified coordination among the police, paramilitary, army, marine commandos and NSG personnel. This is only possible under a unified command; nor were there any formalised communications among them.
“They were apparently communicating with others on cell phones, which is unthinkable in a battlefield scenario.”